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THE CORPORATION'S SPLIT PERSONALITY 
Herbert Hovenkamp * 
THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE 
SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY. By Phillip L 
Blumberg. New York: Oxford University Press. 1993. Pp. xx, 316. 
$45. 
Phillip I. Blumberg1 is a distinguished treatise scholar of corporate 
law.2 In The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law he makes a 
normative argument for at least modest revision in the law of corpora-
tions mainly to base liability on the enterprise as a whole, rather than 
to divide the corporation into its distinct legal entities, such as parent 
and subsidiary. 
Blumberg distinguishes between "entity" conceptions and "enter-
prise" conceptions of corporate law (pp. 21-45). Entity conceptions 
formalize corporations as legal institutions, emphasizing that they are 
legal "persons" and that the legal form defines the nature of the entity. 
Under the entity conception, for example, the law of limited share-
holder liability remains sacrosanct, even if the corporation is a subsidi-
ary and its only shareholder - the parent - is also a corporation. 
Blumberg sees little policy justification for preserving such a principle, 
and great potential for harm (pp. 52-61). It permits a parent corpora-
tion to shield itself from liability for its own wrongs, even when the 
general principle justifying limited liability - concern for the protec-
tion of inactive shareholders - does not apply. 
By contrast, enterprise conceptions of the corporation view the 
corporation as a functional profit-maximizing entity, more or less eco-
nomically defined. Incorporation of subsidiaries is no more than a 
technical fact, done mainly for purposes of regulatory compliance, as 
well as for tax and liability avoidance. With respect to liabilities 
against strangers such as creditors or tort victims, Blumberg believes 
such firms should be treated as a single enterprise (p. 253). Thus the 
parent should be held readily accountable for the injury-causing acts 
or omissions of its subsidiaries, notwithstanding separate legal per-
sonhood and a general doctrine of limited liability. 
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Blum.berg's approach to the issue of entity versus enterprise con-
ceptions of the corporation is traditional and, in fact, quite conserva-
tive. This book contains virtually no economic analysis of the business 
firm. 3 The omission of economic analysis is somewhat unfortunate be-
cause economic analysis of the nature of the firm could provide many 
insights into the kinds of questions that Blumberg considers, such as 
tort or debtor liability of parents for the acts of wholly owned subsidi-
aries (pp. 87, 92), the capacity of corporations related by ownership to 
be "conspiring entities" for the purposes of antitrust law (pp. 98-100), 
the extent to which a court may obtain judicial jurisdiction over a for-
eign parent based on the activities of a domestic subsidiary (pp. 116-
17, 193-99), and so on. Indeed, much current economic analysis 
would support Blum.berg's substantive position.4 
Ronald Coase's pathbreaking article, The Nature of the Firm, 5 de-
fined the scope and size of a corporation in terms of profit maximiza-
tion and the costs of using the market. As a result, law-and-economics 
scholars have tended to view the internal structure of the firm as 
driven largely by considerations of profit maximization. 6 A firm 
purchases the things it needs from others through market transactions 
up to the point that the costs of purchasing from others equal the cost 
of producing those things for itself; at that point the firm switches. 
Transactions that were formerly part of the market become internal to 
the firm itself. So, for example, General Motors might purchase auto-
mobile bodies from one or more outside firms as long as that option 
costs no more than producing them in house. As soon as the cost of 
market transactions makes outside purchase more expensive than in-
side production, however, General Motors will begin making automo-
bile bodies for itself. 
Of course, the economic analysis of the structural determinants of 
the firm can include many things in addition to the simple transaction 
costs of using the market. This analysis also includes the costs of regu-
latory compliance, which in tum includes the costs of complying with 
corporate law. Just as General Motors must decide whether to buy or 
make automobile bodies, so too it must decide whether to make them 
through an unincorporated division or a separately incorporated 
subsidiary. 
The Coaseian analysis of the nature of the firm applies in the same 
way to the question of incorporation as it does to the basic question 
about production inside or production outside the firm, although the 
3. For such an analysis, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE Eco-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). 
4. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Contractual 
Perspective, 18 J. CORP. L. 185 (1993). 
5. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386 (1937). 
6. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 1-39. 
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relevant factors are different. The firm compares, at the margin, the 
transaction, tax, and other costs encountered in separate incorporation 
of subsidiaries against the gains to be realized. Most of the costs and 
gains in this case are consequences of various aspects of the legal and 
regulatory system, rather than costs of using the market. If the princi-
pal gain from separate incorporation of subsidiaries is reduced parent 
liability, and if this is nothing more than a mechanism for externaliz-
ing a certain cost of doing business by shifting it to others - such as 
creditors or tort victims - then limited liability for the parents of 
wholly owned or substantially controlled subsidiaries is very likely 
inefficient. Limited liability would lead the parent to refrain from in-
vesting in efficient, risk-minimizing procedures or to overinvest in ar-
eas where social costs are greater than prospective gains, but those 
social costs could effectively be forced upon others. 
Blumberg is not an economist, however, and did not set out to do 
this kind of analysis. One should not generally criticize his book for 
failing to do something he never intended, and economics does not 
provide the only way of looking at the problem. Rather, Blumberg's 
approach is both historical and comparative. The central thrust of his 
historical argument is that limited liability was not inherent in the na-
ture of the corporation but was something that developed over time 
(pp. 10-14). Further, its main purpose was to protect the nonpar-
ticipatory shareholder (pp. 10-14). As long as the shareholder of a 
small firm is also a controlling participant, the case for limited liability 
is rather weak because such a rule effectively limits the liability of the 
entrepreneur for his own acts. 
As absentee shareholders become increasingly prominent, how-
ever, limited liability performs the more salutary function of encourag-
ing investment, by decreasing the extent to which an investor's other 
assets are at risk. Historically, when liability was not limited, it was 
joint and several. A single shareholder could effectively be held re-
sponsible for the entire judgment against the corporation, although 
there might be a subsequent right of contribution against the others. 
Blumberg believes the better rule would be pro rata liability so that 
each shareholder is liable for a percentage of the total judgment that 
reflects his percentage ownership in the firm (p. 126). For example, 
even a moderately large individual shareholder in Exxon, with 1000 
shares, would own only .00003034 percent of its 1.813 billion out-
standing shares. This liability exposure is significantly less than joint 
and several liability. Of course, the best rule from the shareholders' 
perspective is limited liability, which effectively provides that the 
shareholder's liability for any judgments against the corporation is 
limited to his investment in shares. That is, the shares may become 
worthless as the judgment is paid off, and thus the investment may 
become worthless as well, but the shareholder may not receive a defi-
ciency judgment for what is left over. Limited liability effectively en-
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sures the shareholder that he can invest without risking his other 
assets. The emergence of limited liability was probably necessary to 
facilitate the emergence. of the modern capital market. Importantly, 
the absentee shareholder is not responsible for the acts of the corpora-
tion and is not more than marginally involved in making the decisions 
that subsequently yield liability. 
This historical rationale for limited liability, Blumberg observes, is 
of little relevance when the shareholder is a parent firm that owns all 
or perhaps a controlling interest in the subsidiary and sets the subsidi-
ary's policy or perhaps even directs its daily operations (pp. 121-50). 
In that case, a blanket rule of limited liability can effectively absolve 
the enterprise from acts for which it is responsible, shifting these costs 
to others. 
Blumberg's historical argument is telescoped and highly gener-
alized. In the process, it necessarily distorts a rather complicated his-
torical picture. The picture is mainly complicated by the fact that the 
United States has never had a national corporation law. The individ-
ual states had their own statutes and did not pursue identical policies. 
In fact, limited liability was fairly robust in the United States at an 
earlier stage than Blumberg implies7 and well before the rise of the 
large, publicly owned business :firm. 8 To be sure, Jacksonian corpora-
tions could and did have passive shareholders, but they tended to be 
family members, business acquaintances, or other local people who 
had at least a modest knowledge of the corporation's activities. The 
one exception was the railroads, for which stock ownership was spread 
more widely. Generally, however, limited liability in the United States 
before 1880 or so was tied to the corporation's paid-in capital. Indeed, 
under most of the general incorporation acts passed during the Jack-
son Era (1828-1850) and after, shareholders had limited liability only 
after the stated capital of the corporation was fully paid in. An absen-
tee shareholder would likely know no more about the extent to which 
the corporation's capital was paid in than about the extent of the 
firm's liability-generating business activities.9 
The rationale tying limited liability to paid-in capital was the dis-
tinctly premarginalist view that the paid-in capital established a 
"fund" for the payment of future corporate obligations and thus 
served precisely the same purpose as a natural person's assets or estate. 
That is, in determining whether a corporation was creditworthy, one 
looked at the amount of capital that had been paid in, not at the cor-
7. See pp. 10-11. 
8. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 49-55 
(1991). 
9. See id. at 51-52. 
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poration's earning potential.10 In this sense, limited liability was noth-
ing other than a consequence of legal personhood. Classical legal 
theory treated the corporation as a "person" in numerous respects; 
one way it did so was to conclude that the corporate person's debts 
were to be paid out of that person's assets. 11 
Blumberg's argument based on comparative law is more convinc-
ing overall than his historical argument and carries stronger policy 
implications. Some other industrialized nations are significantly ahead 
of the United States in dealing with problems of corporate liability on 
an enterprise rather than an entity basis. 12 Here, Blumberg notes, one 
must separate questions of local regulatory compliance - which may 
require the use of local incorporation - from liability for the overall 
activities of the enterprise (pp. 168-201). Even in this area, however, 
the acceptance of enterprise principles has been incremental rather 
than revolutionary, and piecemeal rather than global. 
This is a readable book, easily accessible to someone who knows 
little of the law of corporations and, indeed, to those with no legal 
training at all. It treats the issues in an intelligent, balanced way, 
which is just what one would expect from a scholar of Blumberg's 
stature. 
10. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 V AND. L. 
REV. 305, 346-58 (1993). 
11. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 53-55. 
12. See pp. 160-61 (New Zealand), 161-63 (Germany), 165-67 (European Community). 
